Sports, Inc. Volume 8, Issue 2 by ILR Cornell Sports Business Society
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Sports, Inc. The ILR Cornell Sports Business Society 
Spring 2016 
Sports, Inc. Volume 8, Issue 2 
ILR Cornell Sports Business Society 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/sportsinc 
 Part of the Benefits and Compensation Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, 
Collective Bargaining Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and 
Sports Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Labor Economics Commons, and the 
Unions Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the The ILR Cornell Sports Business Society at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sports, Inc. by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Sports, Inc. Volume 8, Issue 2 
Description 
The ILR Cornell Sports Business Society magazine is a semester publication titled Sports, Inc. This 
publication serves as a space for our membership to publish and feature in-depth research and well-
thought out ideas to advance the world of sport. The magazine can be found in the Office of Student 
Services and is distributed to alumni who come visit us on campus. Issues are reproduced here with 
permission of the ILR Cornell Sports Business Society. 
Keywords 
sports, sports business, sports management, collective bargaining, negotiation 
Disciplines 
Benefits and Compensation | Civil Rights and Discrimination | Collective Bargaining | Dispute Resolution 
and Arbitration | Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law | Labor and Employment Law | Labor Economics | 
Unions 
Publisher 
ILR Cornell Sports Business Society 
Comments 
© Cornell University. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
This book is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/sportsinc/12 
Cornell University's ILR School
Sports, Inc.
Caught Looking: 
The Struggle for 
Unionization in 
Minor League Baseball
ILR Sports Business Society
2015-2016 Ä
For more information on 
Sports, Inc. or the 
ILR Sports Business Society, 
please contact 
Advisor Kevin Harris 
at kfh4@cornell.edu.
Executive Board
^ * Advisor Kevin Harris
ijr Co-President Sarah Gilman '16
Co-President Ethan Cramer Gibbs'
President of Magazine Karthik Sekharan '17 
President of Radio Ben Gilman '18
President of Blog Skyler Kanfer'17
VP of Events Josh Klein '18
JlJ; Creative Director Sabrina Smith '18
pa VP of Marketing Alex Zalesne '18
VP of Finance Evan Lefkovitz '16
Magazine Staff
Editor-in-Chief 
Layout Editor
Karthik Sekharan '17 
Sabrina Smith'18
Josh Klein "18 
Stephen Driscoll'18 
Ben Gershenfeld '19 
Noah Fink'19 
Chudi llogu'19 
Jordan lsenberg'17
lVr/ter 
Writer 
" U  Writer 
\ Writer 
Writer 
Sfe» Writer
Zachary Torng'19
Hannah Bluestein '19
* The ILR Sports Business Society, an independent student
3c - organization located at Cornell University, produced and is 
responsible for the content of this publication. This publica- 
tion was not reviewed or approved by, nor does it necessarily 
'■ V A  express or reflect the policies or opinions of, Cornell University 
*  or its designated representatives.
Volume VIII, Issue 2: Spring 2016
Contents
The Lap of Luxury:
Major League Baseball and the 
Competitive Balance Tax
By Noah Fink '19
Caught Looking:
The Struggle for Unionization in 
Minor League Baseball
By Josh Klein ' 18
Gaming the System:
The Draft Lottery in the Modern NBA
By Stephen Driscoll'18
Rebranding The Premier League
ByChudillogu‘19
Who's Really Being Punished?
By Ben Gershenfeld ‘19
Major League Soccer:
Best in the World by 2022?
By Jordan Isenberg' 77
George Steinbrenner, the architect of the modern Yankees franchise and its free-spending 
ways
Photo courtesy of Latino Sports.
Noah Fink ‘19
The year 1994 saw America’s pastime 
fade into the shadows as one of the longest 
strikes in American professional sports 
history commenced.1 The dispute erupted 
because of an attempt by MLB owners to 
curtail player salaries (via a salary cap) in 
order to ensure that the league did not con­
tinue to have a growing disparity between 
the “rich” and “poor” teams’ abilities to 
sign free agents. After a brutally divisive 
strike and Federal intervention, a compro­
mise was reached. The 1996 Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) contained 
the first attempt at a “luxury tax”, which 
would penalize the teams boasting the top 
five highest payrolls in baseball. This form 
of the luxury tax lasted from 1997-1999, 
and the years 2000-2002 saw no penalties 
associated with payroll. In 2002; however, 
the two negotiating sides decided to rework 
the concept and the Competitive Balance 
Tax came into being in 2003.2 This new 
tax stipulated that should a team’s payroll 
surpass a predetermined amount (which 
would be readjusted every year), the team 
would have to pay the league a percentage 
of the amount that the team had overspent. 
For its first time surpassing the threshold, a 
team would pay 17.5%, its second offense 
would cost 30%, with 40% for its third 
overage, and 50% for any more subsequent 
offenses.3 Would this system allow for a 
level playing field for teams and curtail the 
dominance of the free-spending, “big mar­
ket” teams or would teams like the Yankees
and Red Sox be able to “buy” their cham­
pionships? In short, how effective has this 
measure been in relation to a hard salary 
cap like that utilized in the NFL, which the 
MLB owners originally wanted?
From data provided by USA To­
day (from 1996-2000)4 and Baseball Pro­
spectus (from 2000-2015)5, there has been 
only one year since 1996 that saw both 
teams competing in the World Series with 
a below-average payroll: the 2015 World 
Series between the Royals and the Mets. In 
the past 20 World Series, 13 matchups fea­
tured two teams who were above the league 
average payroll. Furthermore, 16 of the past 
20 World Series winners have had the high­
er payroll, including the victor from every 
year since 2007. Since 1996, only 10 teams 
in total have claimed the World Series tro­
phy, which points to a pattern that success­
ful teams are likely to be successful again. 
While only two teams, the Yankees and 
Red Sox, have won the World Series while 
having to pay the luxury tax in the same 
season, they account for 25% of World Se­
ries-winning teams since 1996. In total, six 
teams have had to pay the MLB the luxu­
ry tax, with those teams being the Yankees 
(from 2003-present), the Angels (2004), 
Red Sox (2004-2007, 2010-2011, 2015), 
Dodgers, (2013-2015), Tigers (2008) and 
Giants (2015), totaling over $400 million 
in payments, 75% of which has been paid 
by the Yankees and 20% of which has come 
out of the pockets of the Dodgers’ owners.6 
The Dodgers also have the dubious honor 
of having paid the highest amount of the
The Lap of 
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luxury tax for a single year at $40 million, 
as their payroll approached the mammoth 
figure of $275 million.7 So while only the 
Red Sox and Yankees have claimed titles 
with a tax-inducing payroll, it is worth not­
ing that 20% of the league has been willing 
to spend a considerable amount of money 
on player salaries and the resulting tax.
The primary goal of the luxury 
tax is to curtail spending so that “poor” 
teams can compete for and win the World 
Series, and there are some instances of 
proverbial “Davids” facing off against the 
“Goliath” of payroll disparity. The Miami 
Marlins stunned the baseball world when 
they toppled the New York Yankees in the 
2003 World Series while having the mea-
“The primary goal of 
the luxury tax is to 
curtail spending so 
that “poor” teams 
can compete for and 
win the World Series, 
and there are some 
instances of proverbi­
al “Davids” facing off 
against the 
“Goliath” of 
payroll disparity.”
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Y e a r W in n in g  T e a m P a y r o l l  ( l n  S )  
( W in n in g )
P a y r o l l  (I n  S )  
( L e a g u e  A v e .)
P a y r o l l  ( I n  S ) ( R u n n e r - u p ) R u n n e r - u p
1 9 9 6 * NY Yankees 52,189,370 26,709,871 47,„„,000 ATL Braves
1 9 9 7 * FLA Marlins 47,753,000 34,908,977 54,130,232 CLE Indians
1 9 9 8 * NY Yankees 63,159.898 39,532,994 45,368,000 SD Padres
1 9 9 9 * N Y  Yankees 88,130,709 41,150,949 85,080,449 ATL Braves
2 0 0 0 * NY Yankees 92,327,810 55,421,475 79,449,762 NY Mels
2 0 0 1 ARI D-backs 85,080.445 64,967,084 111,161,143 NY Yankees
2 0 0 2 LA Angels 61,414,167 67,280,839 78,514.835 SF Giants
2 0 0 3 FLA Marlins 47,850,000 70,704,480 153,774,814 NY Yankees*
2 0 0 4 BOS Red Sox* 128,545,500 69,446,977 81,845,000 StL Cardinals
2 0 0 5 CHI W hile Sox 75,695,000 73,334,781 78,786,000 HOU Astros
2 0 0 6 StL Cardinals 89,093.658 79,175,087 85,198,456 DET Tigers
2 0 0 7 BOS Red Sox* 147,568,833 83,994.538 57,062,000 COL Rockies
2 0 0 8 PHI Phillies 100,535,047 91,069,506 47,124,500 TB Rays
2 0 0 9 NY Yankees* 203,275,189 92,074,828 137,837,830 PHI Phillies
2 0 1 0 SF Giants 97,023,833 94,139,311 58,490,000 TEX Rangers
2 0 1 1 StL|Cardinals 109,798,000 96,125,367 96,713,370 TEX Rangers
2 0 1 2 SF Giants 131,980,298 100,756,166 133,060,667 DET Tigers
2 0 1 3 BOS Red Sox* 150,665,000 106,625,054 116,505,000 StL Cardinals
2 0 1 4 SF Giants 145,439,474 115,366,765 92,185,521 KC Royals
2 0 1 5 KC Royals 112,857,025 125,429,637 101,344,283 NY Mets
ger payroll of $47,850,000 
(compared to the league aver­
age of just over $70,700,000 
and the Yankees massive pay­
roll of $153,774,814). In 2007, 
the upstart Colorado Rockies 
faced off against the Boston 
Red Sox despite facing a pay­
roll gap of $90,000,000, but 
they fell short. The Tampa 
Bay Rays reached the 2008 
World Series with a payroll of 
47,124,500, almost half that 
of the average MLB team and 
well below the Series-winning 
Philadelphia Phillies’ payroll of 
$100,535,047. Finally, the 2010 
Texas Rangers appeared in the 
Fall Classic with a payroll of 
$58,490,000, and they eventu­
ally fell to the San Francisco 
Giants and their rather mod­
est payroll of $97,023,833. As 
history has shown, it is indeed 
possible for “poor” teams to 
reach the World Series, but they 
have faced an uphill battle in 
terms of actually winning their 
contests. While this particular 
sample size is small, the trend 
can be seen throughout the past 
20 years.
Representing an al­
ternative solution to the issue 
that the MLB owners wished to 
resolve is the NFL Salary Cap, 
which, rather coincidentally, 
went into effect in 1994.8 The 
NFL Salary Cap differs from 
the luxury tax significantly but 
aims to achieve a similar goal 
in that it wishes to impose some 
sense of parity among teams. 
While not every football team 
is definitively constrained by 
the salary cap (that is, some 
teams have room to spend more 
money and choose not to), it 
would seem to be a more effec­
tive tool for combating “strati­
fication”, as all teams can only 
pay out a certain amount to 
players. This contrasts starkly 
with the MLB’s Competitive 
Balance Tax, which, as it was 
shown, only penalizes teams 
with large payrolls while still 
allowing any disparity to con­
tinue. With history acting as a 
guide, it is highly unlikely that 
the MLB will ever change its 
policy in regards to the luxury 
tax, given the uproar that came 
from their last attempt to cur­
tail player earnings, so even if 
the Competitive Balance Tax 
proved ineffective, it would be 
highly unlikely that the MLB 
would even consider changing 
over to a hard salary cap.
When it comes to ac­
tual results, the MLB has had 
63.33% of its current league 
compete in the World Series 
over the past twenty contests, 
while the NFL has had 59.38% 
of its current league in the Super 
Bowl in the same time frame. In 
regards to Super Bowl winners, 
the NFL boasts a percentage of 
34.38% of its teams hoisting a 
trophy from the 1996 season’s 
Super Bowl on, while the MLB 
is slightly behind that figure 
with 33.33%. These numbers 
show, in part, that no signifi­
cant difference exists between 
the results that the Competitive 
Balance Tax and the salary cap 
have yielded. This brings us 
to two possible solutions: ei­
ther the MLB is more evenly 
distributed than was originally 
thought, or that the NFL simply 
experiences the same difficulty 
with ensuring that “any and all 
teams could win”. Given the 
clear advantage that teams with 
larger payrolls have enjoyed 
in reaching the postseason and 
winning the World Series, the 
second conclusion seems plau­
sible. Arguably, the evidence 
points to the MLB’s Luxury 
Tax as more effective in creat­
ing some level of parity in the 
sense that more of its current 
league, proportionally speak­
ing, has actually reached the 
championship game compared 
to the NFL. While it is import­
ant to remember that the NFL 
has had a higher percentage of 
its teams win the championship 
game, the percentage is not 
nearly as large as that between
the percentages of participants. 
While the results are not con­
clusive, it would be very irre­
sponsible to assume that these 
systems are the sole cause of 
these results, and to be sure, 
much more comprehensive 
analysis could be done on this 
subject. Specifically, one could 
look at possible stratification in 
the NFL in the salary cap era 
or the effects of the different 
playoff systems in the crown­
ing of winners, or other such 
factors. The observations made 
here only scratch the surface of 
the complexities that dominate 
the respective games and their 
monetary systems, but perhaps 
this will serve as an indicator 
that the levels of parity among 
and between the two leagues 
are not exactly as one would 
assume them to be.
World Series winners' salaries
Data courtesy of USA Today
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Caught Looking:
The Struggle for Unionization in
Minor League Baseball
Josh Klein ‘18
If things weren’t already bad 
enough for Garrett Broshuis 
in 2006, the sound of an over­
flowing toilet coming from 
the second floor of his Nor­
wich apartment likely signified 
rock-bottom for the 24-year- 
old.1 For the past few months, 
Broshuis had been crammed 
with several coworkers in a 
flat enclosed in a dangerous 
Connecticut neighborhood. 
Though he had managed to 
cope with his $1,100 monthly 
check and seemingly perpetual 
grueling travel until then, the 
flooding of his meager living 
quarters brought the recent col­
lege grad to his boiling point. 
Garrett Broshuis was not a fast- 
food worker barely scraping by 
on minimum wage. Nor was 
the Missouri native an inde­
pendent contractor, struggling 
through the low-demand winter 
months. No, Broshuis, a tall 
and lanky athletic freak, was a 
minor league baseball player.
Broshuis’ story is 
not an uncommon one. Most 
minor-leaguers earn between 
$1,100 and $2,150 a month 
during the five-month, 140- 
game season.2 Long bus rides, 
late-night workouts, and pov­
erty-level wages are simply the 
trade-offs for a chance to some­
day play in the big leagues. Yet 
while such deplorable work­
ing conditions for employees 
in virtually any other industry 
would border on unlawful, 
athlete maltreatment goes rela­
tively unnoticed. Not only are 
their salaries often insufficient 
to cover rent, but minor league
players also receive no over­
time pay or alternative compen­
sation during spring training or 
for participating in off-season 
instructional leagues.3 And the 
past precedent for yearly wage 
increases leaves little hope for 
future change. While salaries 
of major leaguers have sky­
rocketed by more than 2,000% 
since 1976, minor league aver­
age wages have only risen by 
75%, a hike far below the infla­
tion rate of 400% in that spell.4
“So the question 
becomes, why hasn’t 
there been more 
of a push for 
minor league 
representation —  
why are union 
advocates like 
Garrett Broshuis 
so rare?”
In 2006, Garrett Broshuis was 
all too familiar with the pro­
gressively bleak outlook in 
minor league baseball. As 
the righty hurler covered his 
soaked apartment carpet with 
towels, he wistfully reflected 
on the lucrative deals that his 
major league counterparts were 
receiving. The pros, unlike 
lower-level players, were or­
ganized and served by capable 
representatives skilled in the art 
of negotiation. Major league 
CBAs, in stark contrast to mi­
nor league arrangements, sat­
isfied both the owners and the 
players. Fed up with his plight,
Broshuis saw a faint light at the 
end of the tunnel. To escape 
the incessant cycle of trying 
to advance from the secondary 
ranks, minor league baseball 
players, like their professional 
equivalents, needed a union.
According to Gabe 
Feldman, director of the Sports 
Law Program at Tulane Uni­
versity Law School, “MLBPA 
is the strongest” union.5 After 
all, while other premier sports 
leagues like the NBA and NFL 
endured lockouts and labor 
strife, the 2012 MLB collective 
bargaining agreement ensured 
21 consecutive years of labor 
peace for baseball. The con­
tract itself demonstrated the 
substantial bargaining power 
of the Players Association. As 
it usually does, the MLBPA 
secured a minimum wage in­
crease with automatic cost- 
of-living boosts in both of the 
following two years; in 2014, 
even the lowliest major leaguer 
earned at least half a million 
dollars.6 A 5% rise in the por­
tion of players with 2-3 years 
of major league service eligible 
for salary arbitration illustrat­
ed another victory for the PA.7 
Here’s where things get more 
complicated. The two sides 
also agreed to rein in spending 
on players coming to the ma­
jor leagues; penalties would be 
levied on teams for handing out 
bonuses in amateur drafts that 
exceeded imposed thresholds.8 
Why would the MLBPA agree 
to lower signing premiums for 
its youngest players? It’s sim­
ple: amateur draftees are des­
tined for the minor leagues.
Gene Orza, a recently
retired MLBPA lawyer, claims 
there’s nothing wrong with this. 
“We don’t represent them,” 
Orza argued referring to minor 
leaguers, “and have no obli­
gation.”9 Technically, Orza is 
right: the only obligation the 
PA has is to its actual members. 
The approach, at least from 
a major league perspective, 
makes sense. The more mon­
ey owners save on entry-level 
prospects, the more they are 
willing to spend on low- to 
mid-level players. Without 
minor league representation, 
rookies are helpless; “the mon­
ey will always flow in one di­
rection.”10 Legally, the Players 
Association is not accountable 
for preserving minor league 
interests. The ethics of Orza’s 
logic, however, are very much 
in question. An indifference 
to the condition of lower-level 
players is understandable. The 
active pursuit of contract terms 
financially detrimental to future 
minor leaguers? Well, that is 
harder to justify.
MLB’s past collective 
bargaining agreements rather 
obviously outline the benefits 
of a player union: higher wages 
and benefits, job security, and 
valued seniority. So the ques­
tion becomes, why hasn’t there 
been more of a push for minor 
league representation—why
are union advocates like Garrett 
Broshuis so rare? One expla­
nation is the seemingly almost 
universal sentiment among mi­
nor leaguers that, as captured by 
Nationals’ Class AA outfielder 
Randolph Oduber, “It’s the life 
we chose.”" Whether hesitant 
to upset team management, or
6 Sports, In c
merely grateful for the opportunity to play 
baseball for a living, most minor leaguers 
are not campaigning for higher wages. A 
dose of reality, however, could change ac­
cepted norms. From 1987 through 2008, 
only about 17% of players drafted and 
signed played at least one game in the ma­
jor leagues.12 On a sliding scale, from AAA 
down to A, the percentage of future MLB 
players markedly drops with each class. 
The bottom line: the vast majority of base­
ball players will spend their entire career 
in the minors. This understanding is cru­
cial to changing the prevalent perception 
that low salaries and poor conditions are 
simply a “right of passage.”13 Sure, when 
established major leaguers reflect on their 
farm system experience, it is quite easy to 
view time in the minors as a small bump in 
the road. The reality is that a Class A in­
fielder with a family to feed and bills to pay 
is a more accurate embodiment of minor 
league players. For them, their predicament 
is not merely a “bump,” it’s the road itself.
A more logistical impediment to 
minor league unionization efforts is a lack 
of bargaining leverage. Leverage, a fun­
damental concept of labor relations, is es­
sentially “negotiation’s prime mover, con­
ferring power to reach agreement on your 
terms.”14 Unlike major leaguers who drive 
ticket sales, encourage team merchandise 
purchases, and draw fans, leading to lucra­
tive media rights deals, minor league play­
ers have little clout. It is hard to envision 
a minor league players association making 
any substantial gains at the bargaining ta­
ble without the ability to threaten, or even 
sway, the owners. Yet as labor lawyer Don 
Wollett argues in his book Getting on Base, 
a large national union, the Teamsters for 
example, could swoop in and organize the 
minors to keep baseball healthy.15 Theo­
retically, Wollett is correct: the Teamsters 
could organize the minors. But with so 
little money at stake in the minor leagues, 
there is just not enough incentive for a 
national union to justify extending its re­
sources. Perhaps, however, there is a cre­
ative solution to the unionizing dilemma. If 
minor leaguers lack the leverage necessary 
to form their own players association, and 
if a national union is unmoved by a minor 
league opportunity, there is still one more 
potential resolution: expand major league 
baseball’s bargaining unit.
The current bargaining unit for 
baseball includes only the 1,200 players
with major league contracts. The con­
tract’s definition of the unit, however, is 
rather ambiguous. Article 11 of the official 
collective bargaining agreement between 
MLB and the PA reads:
The Clubs recognize the Association as the sole 
and exclusive collective bargaining agent for 
all Major League Players, and individuals who 
may become Major League Players during the 
term o f this Agreement, with regard to all terms 
and conditions o f employment.16
The word “may” is subjective. By 
prevailing interpretation, the modern-day 
bargaining unit contains the 25 athletes per 
team eligible to play at any given time (up 
to 40 on reserve) multiplied by the league’s 
30 franchises.17 Yet such limitations ex­
clude all the minor league players who 
“may” become big leaguers at some point 
in their career depending on the needs of 
their major league affiliate. As Wollett sen­
sibly notes, “the fact that a player ‘may be­
come’ a major leaguer does not mean that 
he ‘is.’”18 The key takeaway here is that 
though the Players Association does not 
speak for minor leaguers, by the terms of 
the contract, it could if it chose to do so. If 
the MLBPA cared about fairness, it would 
try to negotiate more favorable arrange­
ments for amateur draftees and fashion bet­
ter compensation packages for September 
call-ups. Still, the plain truth of the matter 
is that it is capital, not integrity, that drives 
the league. And thus it is money that dic­
tates negotiations.
The Association’s assertion that 
serving minor leaguers would conflict with 
major league interests, though frustrating,
is certainly valid. The concept of distribu­
tive bargaining is quite straightforward: in 
fixed pie negotiations, a bigger slice for one 
party means a smaller portion for another. 
Yet in its unquestioning commitment to fis­
cal gains, the MLBPA has lost sight of the 
intangibles; there are indeed non-monetary 
benefits of minor league representation. 
While increasing minor league wages may 
decrease major league pay, better condi­
tions, at least according to Arizona Dia­
mondbacks reliever Brad Ziegler, “might 
encourage more young athletes to opt for 
baseball.”19 In a sport that saw U.S. youth 
participation drop by 5.3 million children 
and teens between 2000 and 2013, spurring 
kids to get back into the game is more im­
portant than ever.20
The performance of minor 
leaguers also stands to improve with an 
enlarged bargaining unit. Superstar Blue 
Jays shortstop Troy Tulowitzki suggests 
that “the food available to minor-leaguers 
at clubhouses should be more nutritious 
because it provides fuel for their perfor­
mance.”21 Clubhouse sustenance is an 
example of a subject of bargaining that 
goes beyond salaries. With representation, 
minor leaguers could append their current 
arrangement to incorporate provisions that 
enhance player diet, revise outdated trans­
portation protocols, and upgrade living 
conditions. Though harder to quantify, 
such measures would likely improve the 
overall quality of play, leading to a ripple 
effect in which farm call-ups would enjoy 
greater success at the major league level.
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Minor league baseball players are grossly underpaid.
Graphic courtesy of blogspot.com
Despite the perks of organization, 
the last player to talk seriously about mi­
nor league unionization was, unsurprising­
ly, Garrett Broshuis. Even without league 
support, Broshuis has not given up. The 
pitcher turned attorney has challenged the 
classification of baseball players as sea­
sonal employees, thus exempting athletes 
from minimum-wage laws. Conceivably, 
categorization of sports as part-time work 
was once a reasonable argument. But now, 
a time in which spring training and instruc­
tional leagues are all but mandatory for as­
piring major leaguers, baseball is seldom a 
form of cyclical employment. Represent­
ing three former minor league players, Bro­
shuis recently filed a lawsuit against MLB 
for minimum wage and overtime violations 
and unfair business practices.22 Short of 
unionizing, this lawsuit represents minor 
leaguers’ best chance at improving their 
working conditions. Perhaps a victory in 
court will galvanize a rather uninspired 
workforce. With a dose of reality, farm 
system prospects might begin to see the 
benefits of representation. And maybe, just 
maybe, the MLBPA might concede major 
league compensation to support a fading 
game.
A batter is said to have been 
“caught looking” when “a third strike cross­
es the plate in the strike zone and the batter 
does not make an attempt, resulting in a 
strikeout.”23 A called strike three is often 
a source of frustration for players and man­
agers; a two-strike hack, at the very worst, 
would have yielded the same outcome. In
the eyes of Don Wollett, minor league play­
ers have two strikes on them and are ready 
to take a cut (organize): “they’re like a ‘ripe 
plum’ ready for the right person ‘simply to 
pick off.’”24 Of course, preparation and a 
willingness to be represented only go so 
far. Forming a union is, after all, hardly a 
guarantee. But just like a batter buckling 
down in a pitcher’s count, it’s at least time 
for minor leaguers to swing.
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Gaming the System:
The Draft Lottery in the Modern NBA
Stephen Driscoll ‘18
After finishing just outside the playoffs in 
the 2012-2013 season and having traded 
their best player (Andre Iguodala) for a 
player that would never play a game for 
them (Andrew Bynum) the summer prior, 
the Philadelphia 76ers decided to change 
course.1,2 Enter Sam Hinkie. Hired in May 
of 2013 to replace Rod Thom as General 
Manager (GM) and President of Basket­
ball Operations, Hinkie is a member of the 
increasingly prominent sports analytics 
movement sweeping through NBA front 
offices.3 Using the Moneyball-type tech­
niques to find unexploited player value 
through advanced statistics learned during 
his eight years under basketball analytics 
pioneer and Houston Rockets GM Daryl 
Morey, Hinkie hoped to rebuild the Sixers 
into a modem basketball juggernaut.3 That 
vision has yet to come to fruition. Instead 
the Sixers have arguably been for the last
several years, 2013-present, the worst team 
in the NBA.4 So what happened?
Since taking over the Sixers, 
Hinkie has attempted to obtain the most 
important asset for any struggling team: a 
superstar.5 For the vast majority of teams, 
the easiest way to acquire a NBA superstar 
is through the draft.5 The NBA draft seeks 
to redistribute the top incoming young tal­
ent in the NBA to the teams that need it 
most by sequencing the picks in the inverse 
order of the teams’ regular-season records.6 
Put simply, the worst teams pick first, while 
the best teams pick last. However, in the 
NBA, the team with the worst record is not 
guaranteed the first pick. Instead, the order 
of the top fourteen picks (representing the 
fourteen teams that did not make the play­
offs that year) is chosen through a weight­
ed-lottery system that favors the teams (out 
of the fourteen) with the worst records and 
works against teams with better records.6
From a lottery machine with four­
teen ping-pong balls numbered 1-14, four
numbers are chosen three separate times 
(without taking out the drawn numbers). 
The NBA only employs this drawing pro­
cess for the first three picks, and after that 
the rest of the teams are ordered based on 
the inverse of their regular season records 
(except for the NBA Finals Champion who 
always picks last). To determine which 
teams win the first three picks, before the 
drawing each team is assigned a certain 
number, a certain number of four-number 
combinations (ex. 14-1-3-4, order doesn’t 
matter) out of the possible 1,001 (al­
though there is one combo that goes unas­
signed).6 The distribution of these random­
ly assigned combinations is how the NBA 
weights the lottery process. For example, 
in 2015 the Minnesota Timberwolves fin­
ished with the worst record in the league. 
The Timberwolves were subsequently as­
signed 250/1000 of the delegated combina­
tions giving them a 25% chance of winning 
the lottery and gaining the first pick.6 For 
the worst team in the league, this means
The NBA draft lottery is an annual event held since 1985
Photo courtesy of nba.com
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Seed Chances 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th
1 250 .250 .215 .178
2 199 .199 .188 .171
3 156 .156 .157 .156
4 119 .119 .126 .133
5 88 .088 .097 .107
6 63 .063 .071 .081
7 43 .043 .049 .058
8 28 .028 .033 .039
9 17 .017 .020 .024
10 11 .011 .013 .016
11 8 .008 .009 .012
12 7 .007 .008 .010
13 6 .006 .007 .009
14 5 .005 .006 .007 
The lower the seed, the 1
.261 .360 .084 .004
.439 .305 .040 .001
.599 .232 .018 .000
.724 .168 .008 .000
.813 .122 .004 .000
.870 .089 .002 .000
.907 .063 .001 .000 
.935 .039 .000 
.960 .018 
.982
' the chance of getting of the first pick in the NBA draft lottery.
Graph courtesy of nba.com
the lowest pick they could have 
is 4th, while giving them a
25% chance for the 1st pick, a
21.51% for the 2nd pick, and a 
17.77% chance for the 3rd pick 
(which leaves a 35.72%  chance 
for the worst case 4th pick).6 
The better the team was that 
year, the fewer combinations it 
gets and the worse chance it has 
to win one of the first three picks 
in the lottery. For instance, the 
Oklahoma City Thunder (the 
team with the best record of the 
14 non-playoff teams last year) 
only had 5/1000 assigned com­
binations or only a combined 
1.82% chance of winning any 
of the top three picks.6 Under­
standing these odds, many GMs 
have deduced that the best way 
to guarantee a top pick (where 
for the most part the best play­
ers are chosen7) is simply to 
become as bad as possible. It is 
here that Hinkie has succeeded 
wildly.8
Within the span of 
three years, the Sixers have 
gone from a record of 38 wins 
and 44 losses (38-44) in the 
2012-2013 season to a com­
bined (as of 2/27/15) 45-177 
in the two and a half years 
since Hinkie’s arrival to Phila­
delphia.8 To achieve this goal, 
Hinkie executed many trades 
that often netted the Sixers fu­
ture assets, such as draft picks, 
in exchange for quality veteran 
players the Sixers possessed or 
for the Sixers to take unwanted 
contracts off the other team’s 
roster.9 This has left the Sixers 
roster over the last couple of 
years to be filled by castoffs, re­
cently drafted players, or play­
ers traded to them with burden­
some contracts. Neil Paine at 
fivethirtyeight.com (an affiliate 
of ESPN) calculated that the 
Sixers have been worse than 
any team in the last three years 
and that they have made less 
progress than expansion teams 
that start with no assets.4 What 
have the Sixers accomplished 
by being this bad?
In return for losing, 
the Sixers have stockpiled a 
treasure trove of future draft 
picks from various teams, have 
acquired several talented young 
players and the rights to oth­
ers that are playing overseas 
(particularly Dario Saric), and 
gained pole position to finish 
with the worst record in the 
NBA this year and thus have the 
best chance to win the draft lot­
tery. Although the Sixers have 
been historically bad, they have 
not during Hinkie’s tenure had 
the worst record in the league 
or obtained the first pick.9 In the 
upcoming draft the Sixers (at 
press time) have the rights to at 
least four of the first 31 picks.10 
Along with their current young 
players such as Jahil Okafor, 
Nerlens Noel, the injured Joel 
Embid, and Robert Covington, 
the Sixers have the potential to 
become a winning team within 
the next couple of years.11 In­
deed, over the last couple of 
months the Sixers have shown 
a willingness to become com­
petitive in the near-future by 
trading several picks for tal­
ented point guard Ish Smith 
and by signing veteran Elton
Brand to mentor the young­
er players such as Okafor.1213 
This commitment to become 
competitive also extends to the 
coaching bench where the Six­
ers have signed the revered of­
fensive guru Mike D’Antoni as 
an assistant to head coach Brett 
Brown.14 Altogether, the Sixers 
with their young core, numer­
ous draft picks (including those 
from other teams), and upgrad­
ed coaching staff have laid a 
real groundwork to winning. 
However to build this core 
that as of now has gone 8-50 
this season, the Sixers have 
had to pay a substantial cost in 
terms of ticket sales, revenue, 
respectability, and prestige in 
league inner circles.15’1617
Within the last three 
years, the Sixers, who play in 
the fourth largest media market 
in the country, have suffered 
severe setbacks in terms of at­
tendance as fans have become 
uninterested in the consistent 
losing.18 Currently, the Sixers 
have the second least attended 
home games this season and 
have been in the bottom three 
in home attendance each of the 
last three years.14 As a result,
the Sixers have seen revenue 
fall to last in the league at only 
$124 million and have seen 
their franchise valuation sink to 
the third lowest in the league. It 
should be noted that, much like 
every other team in the league, 
both their valuation and reve­
nue is up from three years ago in 
part due to a massive television 
rights contract.15 Finally, until 
Josh Harris, the owner of the 
Sixers relented and hired Jerry 
Colangelo as Chairman of Bas­
ketball Operations, the Sixers 
had been under enonnous pres­
sure from other owners and the 
league office to make an effort 
to put an end to their losing.16 
Other team owners and league 
officials have been worried that 
the Sixers are threatening the 
integrity of the league (chal­
lenging the notion that all the 
teams want to win), and that the 
Sixers have hurt other teams’ 
bottom lines as the Sixers draw 
hardly any road crowds and 
thus depress attendance when 
on the road as much as when 
they are at home.16 The Sixers 
also generally affect the parity 
of the league as whole, and set 
a precedent (if the current front
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office is successful) of teams avoiding be­
ing good. By creating, in essence, two tiers 
of teams: potential title winners and poten­
tial lottery winners, the Sixers make many 
of the regular season 
games (in already 
the most predictable 
sports league) less 
competitive and less 
exciting.19 Overall, 
the Sixers’ pursuit of 
losing to potentially 
draft the best young 
players has made 
fans, the media, oth­
er teams, and the 
NBA itself question 
whether the current 
draft rules incentiv- 
ize losing and if a 
different way to allocate the best incoming 
young talent is necessary to prevent radical 
rebuilding efforts like those of the Sixers 
from happening again.16
The fear of more teams embrac­
ing the Sixers’ model is real. In the fall 
of 2014, the league attempted to pass re­
form that would have shifted the odds of 
the fourteen non-playoff teams to win the 
lottery.20 For example, the Timberwolves 
who had a 25% chance to win the lottery 
would now only have an 11% chance, as 
would the three other worst teams.18 After 
the bottom four, the odds would decline 
slowly with the best non-playoff team (the 
Thunder last year) having a 2% chance of 
winning the first pick (better than the cur­
rent odds of around 2% to win any of the 
first three picks combined).18 Ultimately, an 
alliance of the Sixers, Thunder, Spurs, and 
other smaller market teams banded togeth­
er to reject this reform.18 Nonetheless, the 
league has continued to search for alterna­
tives to the current model that many fear 
encourages efforts like those of the Sixers 
to construct rosters that are intended to 
lose.
One radical idea is what has been 
called the “Wheel Proposal.”21 This con­
cept eliminates the draft lottery entirely and 
severs the connection between draft order 
and regular-season record. Instead, teams, 
in a predetermined order, would cycle 
through each of the thirty first-round draft 
slots once every thirty years. The order of 
the picks would be generated to make sure 
that each year a team selected players in 
different areas of the draft to ensure equity.
A 6-year example of such an order of picks 
would be 1st, 30th, 19th, 18th, 7th, and 6th. 
19 Without the connection to futility or 
success teams would have no incentive to 
lose because there 
would be no reward 
in doing so. Al­
though this propos­
al eliminates strate­
gic losing, it creates 
a new set of issues 
that would be diffi­
cult to address such 
as the possibility of 
losing teams hav­
ing an inability to 
quickly get better if 
they miss on a good 
draft pick or two, 
and maybe more 
problematic, a championship team hav­
ing the chance to have a really high draft 
pick.19 No matter what direction the league 
goes in, there has been a growing consen­
sus that the current lottery system is broken 
and provides the wrong incentives to team 
that are not championship contenders.
The Philadelphia 76ers present an 
interesting case study on the merits of stra­
tegic losing and its place in the NBA. For 
now many teams believe the Sixers strate­
gy has a place in the NBA. Yet, for the good 
of the fans and the game of basketball the 
merits of the Sixers strategy should contin­
ue to be discussed and then - if needed - 
changed.
“Within the last three 
years, the Sixers, 
who play in the fourth 
largest media 
market in the country, 
have suffered severe 
setbacks in terms of 
attendance as fans have 
become uninterested 
in the consistent losing.”
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Rebranding The Premier League
Chudi Ilogu ‘19
If you’ve ever followed soccer in your 
life, you would know some of these clubs: 
Chelsea, Manchester United, Barcelona, 
Real Madrid, Liverpool and Arsenal. These 
are the 6 most popular clubs in the world 
(according to Forbes), 4 of which compete 
in the Barclay’s English Premier League, 
the top league in England. However, this 
past season has led to an upset of the tradi­
tional hierarchy. As of writing this article, 
Arsenal is in 3rd place, Manchester Unit­
ed in 5th, Liverpool in 9th and Chelsea in 
13th. At the top of the table? Leicester City, 
a newly promoted team. New sponsors 
have splashed their logos upon previous­
ly unpopular jerseys. Samsung’s Chelsea 
jerseys and AIG’s Manchester United kits 
are now “retro” collectable items, rather 
than relevant replica jerseys. Things have 
obviously changed in the Premier League, 
and though certain things like the jerseys 
are less appealing, the actual competition 
of the Premier League has changed for the 
better.
To begin understanding the rea­
son behind the changing Premier League, 
we must realize that the 2013/14 season
was the most profitable in Premier League 
history.1 The previous most profitable sea­
son was the 1997/98 season, where teams 
(I might also reference them as clubs) 
showed an average profit of £49m. The 
2013/14 season dwarfed that, with the av­
erage soaring to £150m.2 What changed 
during this time? New investors dumped 
boatloads of money into previously aver­
age clubs, allowing them to sign new and 
talented players, thus elevating them to the 
level of previous “super-clubs”. The main 
example of this is Manchester City Foot­
ball Club. Manchester City had not won the 
first division league title in over 10 years 
or the League Cup (a tournament between 
the 3 top English divisions) when they re­
ceived a record breaking sponsorship of 
£400m from Etihad Airways. That year, 
they hired a new, world class manager, and 
bought 5 players who would become part 
of their starting 11 week in and week out.3 
Manchester City wasn’t the only team that 
received an investment bonus that year, as 
Manchester United, Tottenham and West 
Ham all followed suit. This type of spend­
ing can allow previously decrepit teams to 
become powerhouses in the league, creat­
ing a more competitive and entertaining
While 47 clubs have competed in the Premier League since it's inception in 1992, only 5 
have won the title.
Photo courtesy of Beast Mode Soccer
league. However, that is not even where 
the change necessarily began, as 2012 also 
proved a year of change in the Premier 
League.
For most Americans and non-En­
glish viewers, Fox Soccer Channel was one 
of the only channels to show the Premier 
League weekly. That all changed when, in 
2012, NBC bought broadcasting rights to 
the Premier League. Now soccer was avail­
able to a wider audience and more easily 
accessible to previous supporters. It should 
be noted that NBC has seen a 150% rise 
in viewership since they began Premier 
League coverage in the 2012/13 season.4 
This obvious increase in the popularity of 
the brand that is the Premier League has 
also been recognized by many corporations 
who have subsequently invested in adver­
tising in teams within the league. This in­
flux of new (and predominantly American) 
fans has also reshaped the support base for 
clubs that were historically less popular. 
For example, since the 2012/13 season, 
Manchester City saw their fan base in­
crease by 423%.5 That amount of growth 
was previously unheard of, especially with 
a team that didn’t have a rich history. So, 
we can accurately claim that the fans of the 
Premier League changed as well, growing 
in number and in support.
If investments, broadcasting and 
wins weren’t enough, the Premier League 
has announced another change, due for 
the 2016/17 season. The Premier League 
recently redesigned their logo, going from 
the proud badge of a lion with a paw con­
fidently atop a ball, on top of the blockish 
font spelling “Barclay’s Premier League”, 
to a minimalistic design of a lion next to 
a more rounded font simply reading “Pre­
mier League”. This is the first time the logo 
has changed so substantially since 2001, 
when Barclays became the official spon­
sor, replacing Carling. Why is this signifi­
cant? It accents the overarching change that 
the Premier League is experiencing. Why 
have the old logo, reflective of a time that 
has clearly passed, when you can have a 
newer, “hip” one that your new audience 
members can call their own? The changing 
of the logo makes clear a single point: the 
previous logo, and the history of the teams
12 Sports, In c
Leicester City currently sits atop the Premier League standings. This would be amazing for a
team that was only recently in the Championship.
Photo courtesy of The Guardian
that came with it, are just that: history that 
doesn’t determine the future.
With the decline of certain teams 
in domestic standings, coupled with their 
performance decline in international tour­
naments, the stature of the Premier League 
has obviously changed, so such a redesign 
is understandable. As I stated before at 
press time, Chelsea, one of the most his­
torically dominant teams in the Premier 
League, was in 13th place out of 20 teams. 
Leicester City, a historically 2nd division 
team, is on top of the league. This trend of 
the historic “greats” failing to live up to 
their history is now seemingly common­
place in the Premier League. This is even 
apparent in international competitions. In 
the European Champions League (the elite 
international tournament for the best clubs 
in the world), Premier League clubs have 
been floundering in recent years. Histori­
cally, the Premier League is the league with 
the most winners and runners up. However, 
since 2012, no English club has made it to 
the finals and they have also generally had 
a hard time qualifying for even the quar­
ter finals. This could be due to a multitude 
of factors: a harder domestic league thus 
making players more tired, an increase in 
the talent of other teams, or rules regarding 
domestic players. The result, however, is 
still the same: Premier League teams don’t 
perform as well and aren’t feared in inter­
national competition like they used to be. 
Why is that okay though? Let me use Chel­
sea for example. In 2012, when they won 
the Champion’s League, they finished 6th 
in the Premier League, 35 points behind 
champions Manchester City and runner up 
Manchester United. They had stopped field­
ing their best 11 players in Premier League 
competitions in order to rest their stars for 
the Champions League. This left the Chel­
sea fan base to stop paying attention to the 
Premier League and for a generally worse 
competition, allowing lower teams to get 
easier points from playing Chelsea. This 
kind of sabotage of the league is avoided if 
teams aren’t expected to win international 
competitions, allowing for a more compet­
itive and entertaining league.
The purpose of this article is not 
to reflect on the “good old days” (though as 
a Manchester United fan, I would love a re­
turn to said time), nor is it to argue that the 
new Premier League is worse for fans. In 
fact, I believe the Premier League was long 
overdue for a change. A league controlled
by the same 3 teams for a decade would be 
stale and repetitive. I would even argue that 
following the Premier League has become 
purer, with “bandwagoning” becoming al­
most obsolete, as the league has become 
full of upsets. Does it matter to me as a fan 
that teams are doing worse in international 
competition? Yes, but that is a small worry, 
as the Premier League will remain a true 
fan’s bread and butter. The Premier League 
is still the Premier League through all of 
this change. However, gone are the days of 
the fixtures such as the London Derby (Ar­
senal vs. Chelsea) defining the title race. 
Now, it is truly anyone’s league to win.
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Who's Really Being Punished?
Ben Gershenfeld ‘19
College athletes can’t get paid 
right now, and they probably 
won’t be seeing a paycheck for 
their services anytime soon. 
However, there is another 
pressing issue in the world of 
college athletics that affects 
millions of people each year 
and is a crooked system hurt­
ing the wrong people. The 
labyrinth of NCAA sanctions 
and rule violations is as con­
fusing as college astrophysics, 
but even the violations that are 
slam dunks (in the sense of de­
serving a punishment) seem to 
leave players, students, and lo­
cal citizens significantly worse 
off, while coaches and admin­
istrators with multi-million dol­
lar contracts get off scot-free. I 
took a look back at one of the 
most noteworthy NCAA pun­
ishments in its history— Penn 
State football in 2012— and 
was both perplexed and dis­
satisfied with the answer to the 
question: “Who’s really being 
punished?”
In 2012, news sur­
faced that Jerry Sandusky, a 
longtime defensive coach for 
Penn State’s football program, 
had on several occasions sexu­
ally abused children. An egre­
gious and reprehensible act 
alone was soon compounded 
exponentially when it was dis­
covered that members of Penn 
State’s brass, both on an athlet­
ic level and an administrative 
level, were aware of the crimes 
committed by Sandusky and 
staged a cover-up to save the 
nationally-renowned and his­
toric football program and its 
beloved and iconic head coach 
for the past forty-six years. In 
the weeks following the ini­
tial reports, with news trucks 
camped out all over State Col­
lege, the country awaited a 
punishment to be handed down 
by NCAA President Mark Em-
mert, and it was expected to be 
unprecedented.
The penalty was in­
deed harsh: a $60 million fine to 
be paid over five years, a four- 
year postseason ban, five years 
of probation, and a reduced 
allotment of scholarships for 
four years. Furthermore, Joe 
Patemo’s victories from 1998- 
2011 were all vacated.1 But 
how was everyone involved 
affected? The most important 
group of people in any college 
football program— the play­
ers- had absolutely nothing to 
do with this scandal, but they 
were affected immensely. After 
news broke and sanctions were 
handed down, at least eighteen 
Penn State players transferred 
out of the program. A signif­
icant number of high school 
students who were committed 
to Penn State also pulled their 
commitments and pursued oth­
er programs in the wake of the 
scandal.2 Some players, like
star tailback Silas Redd, had 
a bevy of schools begging for 
his talents, and he transferred to 
the University of Southern Cal­
ifornia. But players with lesser 
talent were stuck in a no-win 
situation. They either had to 
transfer to another program and 
completely uproot their college 
lives, or they could stay at Penn 
State and endure a coaching 
change, a loss of resources, and 
a forfeiture of talent. The play­
ers, the backbone of the pro­
gram, who did not contribute 
to the scandal in the slightest, 
faced heavy consequences.
Penn State’s football 
team is like a religion to the 
people of Pennsylvania and 
beyond, just like University 
of Alabama is to the people 
of Alabama and University 
of Texas is to Texans, among 
others. But, as the people of 
Pennsylvania found out after 
Penn State’s football decline, 
these major state universities
Jerry Sandusky being taken away by police.
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How will the Penn State football scandal affect Joe Paterno's legacy and Penn State football players 
going forward?
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don’t only have a stake in the 
citizens’ hearts-- they have a 
bigger stake in their econo­
my. When the NCAA handed 
down Penn State’s punishment, 
the governor at the time, Tom 
Corbett, was terrified of what 
it meant for Pennsylvanians.3 
Referred to as an “economic 
power source for the common­
wealth” by Corbett’s general 
counsel, Penn State’s football 
program generated $50 million 
in revenue in 2010-11 and was 
also responsible for $5 million 
in tax revenue that supported 
approximately 2,200 jobs in 
the state.4 Both public and pri­
vate sector jobs were affected. 
While the loss in tax revenue 
hurt state-funded jobs, private 
businesses like Penn State mer­
chandisers, restaurants, and 
hotels saw a steady decline in 
revenues over the course of the 
football program’s punishment. 
Ticket prices for games at Bea­
ver Stadium declined due to a 
lack of demand.5 A state econ­
omy so dependent on a football 
program was not able to with­
stand the economic chokehold 
that the NCAA sanctions placed
on the Penn State football pro­
gram.
The students who 
painted the Beaver Stadium 
crowd blue and white each 
weekend are also felt the brunt 
of the punishment. Governor 
Corbett expected tuition to rise 
in order to pay that $60 million 
fine, and he was right. From 
2010 to 2015, tuition for Penn­
sylvania residents rose from 
$14,412 to $16,572.6 The tui­
tion increase negatively affect­
ed students, not to mention the 
large amount of public back­
lash towards the school and 
the ongoing media frenzy on 
campus. The students ardently 
supported their beloved school, 
and then that same school be­
trayed them.
College sports bring 
in billions of dollars of revenue 
each year and have a very en­
thusiastic and wide-ranging fan 
base. For those reasons, there is 
little incentive to change. But I 
am confident that players will 
start seeking more power, and 
if that power does not come in 
the form of monetary compen­
sation, it will come elsewhere.
Just recently, the Louisville 
basketball team was banned 
from the postseason tourna­
ment, something that players 
dream about participating in, 
because of wrongdoing by their 
coach, who happens to make 
around $5 million per year.7 He 
will continue to make his mil­
lions and keep his job, while his 
players will be watching other 
athletes play in the postseason 
without them. The NCAA is 
known for being harsh with its 
sanctions, but with the innocent 
bearing the brunt of the punish­
ment and the high-paid culprits 
finding their way out of trouble, 
the question must be asked— 
“Who’s really being punished 
in college sports?”
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Major League Soccer:
Jordan Isenberg ‘17 
•  -------  •
Major League Soccer (MLS) 
was established in 1996 with 
a total of ten teams, was near 
bankrupt, and played all of 
their games in borrowed sta­
diums. Today MLS has a total 
of 20 teams at an average value 
of $157 million per team, with 
14 teams having constructed 
their own stadiums. The reve­
nue of MLS has increased by 
52% over the past two years, 
increasing team value.1 With 
promising domestic and global 
TV deals, incoming star talent, 
increased corporate sponsors, 
encouraging attendance, and 
developing youth programs, 
MLS sees itself as one of the 
best soccer leagues in the 
world. The question is...can 
MLS live up this title?
In 2014 and 2015, 
MLS inked TV deals with both 
international and domestic 
outlets including Sky Sports, 
Eurosport, ESPN, FOX, and 
Univision. For the first time in
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Best in the World by 2022?
Major League Soccer’s histo­
ry, all three television partners 
will feature an exclusive MLS 
Match of the Week, provid­
ing soccer fans throughout the 
country with a destination day 
and time for each network.2 
Soccer fans around the globe 
can now watch MLS, causing 
drastically increased viewer- 
ship over the past few years. 
With a 50% increase in gross 
viewership since 2013, MLS is 
becoming a global brand.3
To be the best you 
have to have the best. The best 
soccer teams have the best 
players. They are located in 
the best cities on the globe, pay 
their talent handsomely, and 
have an intense fan base. Bar­
celona FC calls home its name­
sake in Spain, pays an average 
salary of $8,680,569 a year, has 
an average of 77,632 people 
in attendance for their Primera 
Division games, and employs 
the best like Neymar, Suarez, 
and Messi.4,5 While MLS is no­
where near the competition lev­
els in Europe, expansion into 
the global market may allow 
MLS to attract star talent from 
the European leagues.
The acquisition of 
star talent from the European 
Leagues has led to the success 
of MLS. Since David Beck­
ham’s decision to join the Los 
Angeles Galaxy in 2007, the 
influx of star European play­
ers to MLS has included Frank 
Lampard, Andrea Pirlo, Steven 
Gerrard, Ashley Cole, Nigel de 
Jong, Sebastian Giovinco, and 
David Villa. Each big name 
signing attracts large sponsor­
ship agreements and leads to 
large gate revenues. MLS ex­
pansion teams like the LAFC 
and Beckham’s Miami team 
are looking to sign Cristiano 
Ronaldo and Wayne Rooney to 
contracts in 2017. Signing star 
talent from the top tier in Eu­
rope would spur huge growth 
to MLS. However, without 
signing a big name player MLS 
may struggle to balance the ad­
dition of hundreds of players
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with the level of talent.
Homegrown talent 
and youth development is an­
other issue MLS must tackle 
to become one of the best by 
2022. MLS announced a part­
nership with the United Soccer 
League in 2013 to promote the 
development and growth of 
North American soccer players. 
In 2015, nine MLS teams had a 
reserve or second team compet­
ing in the USL.6 Some of the 
independent USL teams may 
become part of the expansion 
of eight teams into MLS.
Each MLS team has 
its own youth development 
program. Four different U.S. 
Soccer Development Academy 
alumni in the past few weeks 
have experienced a first ap­
pearance for German giants 
Borussia Dortmund, a transfer 
to Chelsea FC, a record MLS 
Homegrown contract and a 
U.S. Men’s National Team de­
but.7 U.S. talent Christian Pu- 
lisic at age 17 is becoming one 
of the best young talents on 
the global stage. His quick rise 
to the first team on Borussia 
Dortmund speaks volumes to 
his talent and the talent of the 
MLS Academy program. Pu- 
lisic made his first start in the 
Bundesliga February 21, 2016 
against Leverkeusen.
While MLS is aspir­
ing to become one of the best, 
low TV ratings and competing 
leagues in Europe and China 
may slow its growth.
While the growth of 
MLS has been strong and con­
sistent, a troubling issue arose 
after Labor Day in 2015. Gary 
Stevenson, President and Man­
aging Director of MLS, was 
troubled by a 15% decrease 
in TV ratings in the months 
of September and October. A
16 Sports, Inc.
decrease in TV Ratings could force MLS 
to pay credits to advertisers as compensa- 
tion-ESPN was forced to pay make-goods 
after low ratings from the College Football 
Playoff. MLS must take action to repair the 
decline in TV ratings to compete with the 
top European leagues.
MLS may also struggle as a result 
of the sudden rise of the Chinese Super 
League (CSL).. With their recent spending 
spree in the transfer window and the ac­
quisitions of Ramires and Jackson Marti­
nez, the CSL looks to rival the European 
leagues. Supported in full by the President 
Xi Jinping, China is hoping to become a true 
soccer nation. With a huge national popu­
lation, regulated youth development pro­
grams, and national funding, China looks 
to break into the existing global soccer 
market. Fortunately for MLS, the growth of 
the CSL has been slow; the skill level of the 
CSL is still overshadowed by MLS and the 
European leagues. Former CSL and MLS 
player Ryan Johnson believed that the CSL 
“wasn’t at the same level as MLS, but the 
level was pretty good.”8 If the CSL contin­
ues to grow and poach players from MLS 
and Europe, it will create undesirable com­
petition and diminish the growth of MLS.
At the end of the 2015 MLS 
season, MLS Commissioner Don Garber 
made a bold prediction about the future 
of the league. “I will absolutely assure 
you whether it’s seven years, or its longer 
than that, I may or may not be around, this 
league will be one of the dominant leagues 
in the world in time... It has to be because 
there’s so many things happening with the 
soccer movement. You have owners that 
are coming in that really believe in the 
sport, broadcasters that do, youth devel­
opment that’s thriving, players that want 
to play here from abroad.”9 With plans for 
a 28 team league by 2020, promising do­
mestic and global TV deals, incoming star 
talent, and developing youth programs, Mr. 
Garber can mold MLS into one of the most 
successful soccer leagues in the world by 
2022.
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